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Abstract
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of the first large-scale unilateral trade
concessions as foreign aid for disaster relief, i.e., EU tariff waivers on goods heavily
exported by Pakistan, which was severely hit by the 2010 floods. Using a triple-
difference approach and a synthetic control approach, we find that the tariff waivers
substantially increased Pakistan’s exports to the EU. The export hike occurred within
a few months after the waivers became effective, and did not significantly depress
exports by competing countries. While the export boost brought greater employment
opportunities in the tariff-waived industries, we find little evidence that the greater
labor demands from trade were particularly beneficial to the areas most affected by
the floods. Our findings suggest that trade policy may complement traditional means of
foreign aid—but trade concessions alone may be inadequate, as the areas most affected
by natural disasters may be poorly targeted.
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1 Introduction
Does foreign aid promote the economic growth of recipients? This has been a central question
in the literature of development and has been a subject of intense debate. Empirical findings
are mixed, often clouded with concerns about sample selection, measurement errors and
identification problems (see e.g. Roodman, 2007; Bazzi and Clemens, 2013; Qian, 2015).
While aid may foster growth by promoting investments in public infrastructure and hu-
man capital, critics are skeptical about the effectiveness of aid. They worry that with the
weak political institutions typical of less developed countries, aid may not be effectively
translated into public investment (see e.g. Easterly, 2003; Svensson, 2003). In particular,
the literature on foreign aid that has focused on the Official Development Assistance (ODA),
which mainly consists of cash and in-kind transfers, shows that the evidence as to the effec-
tiveness of ODA is weak at best; or, it shows that ODA may even adversely affect growth.
For instance, ODA has sometimes been used for unproductive public consumption (Boon,
1996; Alesina and Dollar, 2000); it has also sometimes been used by recipient governments
with weak political accountability to buy political support (Deaton, 2013); and it increases
the incidence and duration of civil conflicts in conflict-prone regions (Crost et al., 2014; Nunn
and Qian, 2014).
In this paper, we investigate trade concessions as an alternative means of aid to ODA. This
form of foreign aid, while it has its own limitations, arguably does not have the drawbacks of
ODA discussed above. For example, trade concessions do not transfer appropriable resources
to recipient governments. Previous studies explored the impacts of preferential market access
granted by the US for Africa and Vietnam. Frazer and van Biesebroeck (2010) find that,
under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, lower tariffs to African countries increase
African exports to the US by 28%. McCaig (2011) also documented the positive trade
creation effects of US tariff cuts in reducing poverty in Vietnam especially for workers with
a low level of education. These results suggest that trade concessions have the potential to
be an alternative means of aiding post-disaster economic growth.
In 2010, Pakistan was hit by the most severe floods in its modern history. To aid the
post-disaster recovery, the EU offered tariff waivers to a list of goods exported by Pakistan.
The trade concessions became effective in late 2012 and constituted the first large-scale aid
program in the form of trade concessions following a natural disaster. This paper evaluates
the effectiveness of trade concessions as a foreign aid tool using the EU’s temporary removal
of tariffs to Pakistan in three respects: (i) whether the tariff waivers lead to trade creation
without diverting exports from other countries to the EU; (ii) how soon the effect of the
trade concessions materializes; and (iii) whether export expansions improve labor market
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outcomes such as earnings and employment.
While the EU’s trade concessions to Pakistan were proposed as disaster relief immediately
after the natural disaster, the tariff waivers became effective only after a lengthy delay in
obtaining WTO approval. The timing of tariff waivers on the 75 products provided a trade-
cost shock arguably exogenous to the performance of Pakistan’s export sector. A difference-
in-differences approach, comparing waived products to non-waived products before and after
the trade concessions, seems a natural approach. However, one might be concerned that the
selection of waived products reflects a differential trend of competitiveness in the related
industries.
To address such concerns, we adopt a triple-difference (DDD) approach in our main spec-
ification. We compare the difference between waived and non-waived products exported to
EU countries to the same difference of exports to non-EU OECD countries. On top of the
usual before-and-after differencing, such additional differencing effectively removes differen-
tial trends between tariff-waived and non-waived products. In the estimation, we follow
Frazer and van Biesebroeck (2010) to include a full set of fixed effects, namely importer-
year, importer-product, and product-year fixed effects, allowing for maximum flexibility in
our specification.
We supplement our triple-difference analysis with a synthetic control analysis using
monthly Pakistan-to-EU export data. In the synthetic control analysis, we create a syn-
thetic control mimicking the time series variation of aggregate exports of the 75 products
with tariff waivers before the waivers became effective. The synthetic control is constructed
as a weighted sum of export volumes of EU-bound, no-waiver products in the 21 Harmonized
System (HS) sections.
Our synthetic control analysis provides a transparent way of visualizing how large the
waivers’ impact on the aggregate export volume of all waived products was, and how fast such
impacts showed up in the data. The synthetic control analysis could also mitigate a concern
that exports of waived products may not follow a common time trend as do the non-waived
products to EU and to non-EU countries. This was especially important because the set
of waived products was unlikely to have been selected randomly from among all Pakistan’s
exports.
We find that tariff waivers increased Pakistan’s exports of tariff-waived goods to the EU
by about 45% and the probability of entering a new destination by 5%. The export expansion
appeared within two months after the tariff concessions became effective. Furthermore, we
find no significant evidence that exports to the EU are diverted away from major textile
and clothing exporting countries during the concession period. Our results indicate that the
trade concessions had strong trade creation effects for Pakistan, without causing substantial
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trade diversion effects to individual competing countries.
We do not find evidence that the waivers also increased waiver goods’ exports to non-EU
destinations or that exports of non-waiver goods were affected. The tariff waivers increased
Pakistan’s export to EU amounts to about 0.3% of Pakistan’s GDP in 2012. In the absence
of a strong multiplying effect, the aggregate impacts seem modest. However, a segment of
population may still benefit from the increase in exports of the waiver goods. To identify
this effect, we further examine the labor market outcomes of households affected by the
2010 floods and households in areas with a share of employment in the textile, garment and
leather industries, whose products account for most of the goods with tariff waived.
Using household survey data, we find that households in areas most severely affected by
the floods experienced slower growth in earnings. On the other hand, household earnings in
areas with high textile employment had greater earnings in 2013 than in 2012. The increase
in earnings was highest for households with low education attainment, which is consistent
with the fact that the textile industries on average employ more workers with low education
than other sectors.
The household earnings increased mainly because of the greater employment opportu-
nities, particularly for women, rather than because of higher wages. However, since textile
industries tend not to concentrate in areas most severely affected by floods, the expansion
in textile employment may not have been of particular benefit to households who lost most
during the floods.
We investigate two related channels through which these flood-affected households may
still be able to benefit from the rise in textile employment even if they do not live in areas with
textile industries. One is internal migration. Changes in households’ age dependency ratios,
which are the ratio of non-working age members to working age members, may indicate
temporary migration as a means of responding to labor market opportunities. A decrease in
the household age dependent ratio in an area may suggest inflows of working-age population.
While we find that the household age dependency ratio dropped in 2013 in areas with large
textile employment, we do not find that the age dependency ratio has increased in flood-
affected areas since 2010.
Flood-affected households may still benefit from remittance sent by families in the textile
industries. However, while we observed greater remittance received by households in flood
areas in 2010 and 2011, we do not find that these households received more remittance
in 2013. Neither do we find households in textile-concentrated areas were sent out more
remittance in 2013.
In sum, tariff waivers were effective in boosting Pakistan’s exports, which created labor
market opportunities for women and people with low education attainment. But no evidence
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suggests that the export performance of textile industries was particularly beneficial to people
living in areas most affected by the 2010 floods.
The rest of this paper is organized as following. Section 2 describes the 2010 floods and
the EU’s responses. Section 3 analyzes the impacts of the EU tariff waivers on the exports
from Pakistan as well as on those from competing countries. Section 4 carries out a synthetic
control analysis on the monthly Pakistan-to-EU export data. Section 5 examines the labor
market impacts of the tariff waivers. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
In late July 2010, unusually heavy rainfalls were recorded across all provinces of Pakistan.
The rainfalls resulted in severe flooding in the Indus River basin. The floods, which were
by far the worst in Pakistan’s modern history, submerged vast land areas, destroyed crops,
and extensively damaged highways, railways, schools and other public infrastructure. Using
data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
we map the extent of the floods in Figure 1. The floods brought about 2000 deaths, affected
20 million people, and caused damage estimated at $9.5 billion (Guha-Sapir et al., 2016).
In September 2010, European leaders reached an agreement to assist Pakistan’s recovery
by temporarily waiving tariffs on 75 products. These products mainly included textile,
clothing and leather products, which were heavily exported by Pakistan to the European
Union (EU). The initial package that the EU submitted to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) went through a series of changes in response to opposition from other competing
countries.1 A revised waiver request was finally approved in February 2012 and was effectively
implemented from November 15, 2012 to December 31, 2013.2 The value of tariff-waived
products amounted to a quarter of Pakistan’s total annual exports to the EU, which is
Pakistan’s largest export market. The normal ad valorem tariff rates for waived products
ranged from 4% to 12.8%, averaging around 9.5% as weighted by the trade volume in 2012.
3 Tariff Waivers and Pakistan’s Exports
We use Pakistan’s annual HS 6-digit product-level export data to 27-EU members and 13
non-EU OECD countries between 2002 and 2013 from UN Comtrade to estimate trade
creation effects of tariff concessions in Pakistan.3 In subsequent sections, we refer to products
1Due to the most favored nation (MFN) clause in the GATT, the EU cannot grant preferential treatment
to Pakistan without WTO approval.
2See Khorana and Yeung (2012) for details.
3Croatia joined the EU in July 2013 and was excluded in the estimations.
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whose tariff would be waived from November 2012 as waiver goods, and others as non-waiver
goods. We also refer to textile, garment and leather industries as textile industries for brevity.
To illustrate the effects of the EU tariff waivers on Pakistan’s exports, we plot three time
series in Figure 2: (i) the total value of Pakistan’s exports of waiver products to the EU; (ii)
the total value of Pakistan’s exports of non-waiver products to EU; and (iii) the total value
of Pakistan’s waiver products exported to non-EU OECD countries. The exports of all three
sets of products had an upward trend. Moreover, non-waived products exported to the EU
and waived products exported to non-EU OECD countries fluctuated in the same directions
as waived products exported to the EU. During the treatment year of 2013, products with EU
waivers exported to EU countries increased dramatically by 27%, while non-waived products
exported to EU countries experienced a modest increase; and the value of waived products
exported to non-EU countries experienced a small drop.
Pakistan’s exports to the EU appears to fluctuate considerably. In particular, exports
to the EU dropped in 2005, 2009 and 2012. In 2005, a WTO ruling terminated the EU’s
preferential treatment to Pakistan under a GSP anti-drug-trafficking scheme (Grossman
and Sykes, 2005).4 There were two years during our sample period in which the EU had
negative GDP growth. At the peak of the Great Recession, EU-28’s GDP decreased by
4.5% in 2009. The European debt crisis also induced a negative GDP growth rate in 2012.
Moreover, Pakistan experienced a wide-spread power shortage in 2012. Industrial production
in Pakistan has been hindered by chronic electricity shortage (Ali, 2015). In 2012, the
shortage was particular severe. During the summer, power was down for as many as 20
hours a day in many areas, provoking riots in these places (Banyan, 2012).
These fluctuations may be a potential concern in a difference-in-differences analysis. In
the next subsection, we describe our triple-difference approach, which addresses such concern
with the inclusion of destination-year and product-year fixed effects.
3.1 Intensive Margin
Tariff is a variable cost. In classical trade models, a fall in bilateral tariffs lowers the relative
price of the exporting country’s products. As a result, it raises relative demand in the
importing country. As in Krugman (1980) and Helpman et al. (2008), the intensive margin
measures the export volumes of existing exporters. Thus, a decrease in tariffs as trade
barriers is expected to increase bilateral trade flows as long as the elasticity of substitution
4Under the GSP Drug Arrangements program, the EU provided preferential market access to eleven Latin
American countries and Pakistan, providing them with incentives to combat illicit drugs trafficking.
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between varieties is positive.5 We examine whether tariff waivers on Pakistan’s exports to
the EU had trade creation effects in the intensive margin using the following triple-difference
specification in a gravity framework:
log(Exportjkt) = α0 + α1Postt + α2Waiverk + α3EUj
+ β1(EUj × Postt) + β2(EUj ×Waiverk) + β3(Waiverk × Postt) (1)
+ γ(EUj ×Waiverk × Postt) + ujkt
where log(Exportjkt) is the log value of exports of product k from Pakistan to country j
during year t (only positive values are included); Postt is an indicator variable indicating
whether the tariff waivers are effective; Postt equals one for year 2013 and zero otherwise;
Waiverk is an indicator variable if product k contains one or more goods with EU tariff
waivers and zero otherwise; EUj equals one if country j is an EU member and zero otherwise;
and the error term is given by:
ujkt = µjt + σjk + ηkt + jkt
where µjt, σjk, and ηkt are importer-year, importer-product, and product-year fixed effects
respectively. These fixed effects absorb all variables typically included in a gravity equa-
tion, including Pakistan and importing countries’ GDP, GDP per capita and multilateral
resistance terms (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Magee, 2008); and pair variables
such as distance and cultural ties, among others; and jkt is a residual error term. Including
each of three fixed effects could be important to avoid potential endogenous bias. For in-
stance, σjk is an effective way of controlling for preferential trade policies on certain products
from importers such as Generalized System of Preference (GSP). GSP has been widely used
to provide preferential tariffs on certain products imported from developing countries by
some industrial countries including EU members. Rose (2004) finds that preferential tariffs
through GSP has a positive effect on trade volumes. Further discussion on these fixed effects
can be found in Frazer and van Biesebroeck (2010).
Table 1 reports the estimates for the coefficients that are not subsumed by fixed effects.
5The implication for the intensive margins at the firm-level is, however, ambiguous. This is because the
exports of existing firms in the market increase while the exports of less productive newly entered firms are
smaller than those of incumbent firms before a fall in tariffs. Lawless (2010) shows that under the assumption
of the Pareto distribution, a firm’s intensive margin is independent of a change in variable costs. Therefore,
it is an empirical question as to whether or not a decrease in tariff could increase the intensive margin of
trade. As firm-level data are available only for limited countries, many studies that sought general empirical
evidence of the implications of firm-heterogeneity trade models tend to use disaggregated product-level data.
For instance, Dutt et al. (2013) and Baier et al. (2014) use HS 6 digit or SITC 4 digit product-level data to
relate their findings to the model of Chaney (2008) and Helpman et al. (2008), respectively.
7
In the first three columns, the sample includes all export volumes that are positive. In the
last three columns, we restrict the sample to importers and products that had positive flows
at the beginning of the sample, i.e Exportjk,2002 > 0.
In Equation (1), γ captures the effect of the EU trade concessions on Pakistan in the
intensive margin of exports at the product level. For instance, EUj × Postt is subsumed
by importer-year fixed effects. Depending on the set of fixed effects included, EU tariff
waivers increased Pakistan’s exports of tariff-waived products to the EU by between 31
log points (Column 2) and 37 log points (Column 6), which amount to a 36% and 45%
increase, respectively. Throughout our analysis of trade data, we calculate the standard
errors adjusted for two-way clustering by importer and product (Cameron et al., 2011). The
coefficient γ is statistically significant at the 5% level for all but one specification. The
estimate in Column (1), which is from a specification that includes only importer-year and
product-year fixed effects, is significant at the 10% level, but is similar to other estimates in
magnitude.
Our preferred estimate with a full set of fixed effects is in Column (3), which is a 38%
increase, and with a sample restriction is in Column (6), which is a 45% increase. What
does a 45% increase in Pakistan’s exports of waived products to the EU imply for Pakistan’s
aggregate economy? In our data, waiver products accounted for 30.3% of Pakistan’s exports
to the EU in 2012. This means that Pakistan’s total exports to the EU due to trade conces-
sions increased by about 13.6%. As exports to the EU account for 21.2% of Pakistan’s total
exports, this indicates that Pakistan’s total exports to the world due to EU trade concessions
increased by about 2.9% in 2013. Given that Pakistan’s exports as a percent of GDP were
12.4% in 2012, the impact on the aggregate economy of Pakistan due to EU trade concessions
is equivalent to 0.36% of its GDP.6 In terms of dollar values, it is approximately 804 million
USD in total and 4.5 USD per capita.7
3.2 Extensive Margin
As trade concessions were temporary, they were unlikely to induce firms’ new entries to
export to the EU market if the fixed costs of exporting were sufficiently large (e.g. Helpman
et al., 2008). However, if the fixed costs were small enough, even a temporary drop in tariffs
could lead firms into a new market by adding product lines or exporting to new destinations.
This was most likely to happen in the case when, under very similar product categories,
some products were waived and others not. For example, Dyed Fabrics (Less than 85% By
Weight of Synthetic Filament, Mixed Cotton), was tariff-waived while the product category,
6Data source: World Development Indicators database of World Bank
7Pakistan’s GDP per capita is about 1,252 USD in 2012 (World Bank).
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Dyed Fabrics (More than 85% By Weight of Synthetic Filament, Mixed Cotton) was not,
which suggests that a firm may be able to add one waiver product into an existing product
line without paying substantial entry costs. Krautheim (2012) also argues that an increase
in the number of exporting firms could even lower the fixed costs of exporting to the same
destination, which could further induce more new entrants to the same market.
We use the same gravity model for the intensive margin as specified in Equation (1), ex-
cept that we replace the dependent variable with an indicator variable equal to one if positive
trade flows take places for the product-destination-year observation and zero otherwise.
Overall, about 9% of product-destination-year observations record positive trade flows,
i.e. they have a dependent variable equal to one. Among waiver products, however, about
70% of observations have a positive trade flow. Such difference confirms that waiver goods
are important products for Pakistan’s export trade and that they have penetrated into the
EU markets.
Table 2 reports the fixed effects estimates for the coefficients that were not subsumed by
fixed effects. Regardless of the specifications for fixed effects, the EU’s tariff waivers increased
the probability of Pakistan’s exports to new destinations in the EU for tariff-waived goods
by about 5%. The coefficient γ is statistically significant at 10% significance level for all
specifications. The significant positive effects were quite surprising because there were only
30% of EU destinations that had no Pakistan exports at the end of 2012. Prior to 2012, out
of 1,782 potential destinations in the EU for waived products, Pakistan had zero exports
to 500 destinations while, at the end of 2013, it had zero exports to only 473 destinations.
On the other hand, out of 924 potential destinations in the non-EU countries for waiver
products, only 273 markets were with no exports at the end of 2012. For non-EU countries,
at the end of 2013 we find some withdrawals such that the number of markets there with
zero trade increased to 286 for waiver products in the non-EU countries.
3.3 Potential Spillover Effects
We may underestimate or overestimate the trade creation effects with our triple-difference
method if there exist positive or negative spillover effects. In particular, a recent literature
documents evidence of destination spillover in exporting. For instance, Koenig et al. (2010)
show positive destination spillover effects from transportation cost sharing using French
firm data and Fernandes and Tang (2014) report positive destination spillover effects from
learning, using Chinese firm data. With positive export spillover to non-EU countries, our
triple-difference approach may underestimate trade creation effects of tariff concessions.
We examine whether tariff waivers from the EU for Pakistan had any spillover effects
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onto other destinations (non-EU importers) using the following difference-in-differences spec-
ification in a gravity framework:
log(Exportjkt) = α0 + α1Postt + α2Waiverk + δ(Waiverk × Postt) + ejkt (2)
where Exportjkt includes only positive flows and j indicates export destinations other than
EU countries. ejkt = µjt + σjk + 
′
jkt is an error term including destination-year fixed effects
µjt, product-destination fixed effects σjk, and an idiosyncratic term 
′
jkt. Other explanatory
variables are similarly defined as before. δ thus captures the extent to which EU’s waivers
to Pakistan spillover to Pakistan’s exports of these goods to other non-EU markets.
In Table 3, the first four columns report the fixed effects estimates for the coefficients
that are not subsumed by the fixed effects. Regardless of sample restriction and fixed effects,
we could not find any spillover effects. For our most preferred specification with the most
exhaustive fixed effects, coefficient on spillover effects was virtually zero. Thus, we find
no evidence of underestimation of trade creation effects on the intensive margin due to
destination spillover effects. In the last two columns of Table 3, we estimate the destination
spillover effects on the extensive margin. As on the intensive margin, we find no evidence of
spillover effects on the extensive margin.
Potentially, the export expansion of waiver goods could spill over to other non-waiver
products. If that is the case, we may overestimate the trade creation effects. We will discuss
such a possibility in Section 4.3.
3.4 Heterogeneous Effects by Tariff Reduction
The magnitude of tariff-cuts on 75 products varies from 4% to 12.8%. In this subsection, we
study whether trade creation effects are driven by a few products, in particular within the
high tariff-cuts sectors, or whether the effects appear in various sectors. In the estimation,
we use the same gravity model and the DDD method, but we additionally include interaction
terms to capture heterogeneous effects, depending upon the magnitude of tariff-cuts:
log(Exportjkt) = α0 + α1Postt + α2Waiverk + α3EUj
+ β1(EUj × Postt) + β2(EUj ×Waiverk)
+ β3(Waiverk × Postt) + γ1(EUj ×Waiverk × Postt) (3)
+ γ2 [EUj ×Waiverk × Postt × (TRk − 8)] + ujkt
where TRk is the percentage of tariff reduction due to the waivers so γ1 captures the trade
creation effect at TRk = 8, which is the median of tariff reduction among the waiver goods.
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Table 4 reports the estimation results allowing differential effects according to magnitude
of tariff-cuts. The first two columns and the last two columns show the effects on the intensive
margin and the extensive margin, respectively. Odd and even columns are different in terms
of fixed effects to be accounted for and our preferred specification is even numbered columns.
We find little evidence that the expansion of exports on the intensive margin depends on the
size of tariff reduction. On the extensive margin, however, the probability of entering a new
market decreases by about 1.7% as the tariff cut increases by 1 percentage.
3.5 The Effects on Competing Countries: Trade Diversion
The initial trade concession package proposed by the EU had drawn objections from several
WTO members, especially major textile and clothing exporting countries such as India and
Bangladesh. To examine the validity of these objections, we quantify the effect of EU’s
tariff waivers to Pakistan on competing countries’ exports to the EU. For each of the major
textile and clothing exporting countries other than Pakistan, we re-estimate Equation (1)
using the same specifications as for Column (4) in Table 1, but replacing the dependent
variable with exports from the major textile and clothing exporting countries. Similarly, for
the extensive margin, we use Equation (1), while replacing the dependent variable with the
indicators of positive export flows from the major textile and clothing exporting countries.
In both equations, the key variable of interest is “EU ×Waiver×Post” and coefficients on
this variable capture trade diversion effects for the countries competing with Pakistan for
the EU imports.
Table 5 reports the results for trade diversion effects on both the intensive and extensive
margins. At the intensive margin, we find no trade diversion effects that are statistically
significant at the 10% significance level for any of the 15 countries.
Though statistically insignificant, the point estimates of diversion effects on the intensive
margin for Thailand and Vietnam are close to 20%. For Thailand, a potential explanation
is that Thailand’s exports of waiver goods have a greater exposure to competition from
Pakistan. In the first subplot of Figure A.1, we plot Thailand’s market shares of each waiver
good in EU’s total imports against Pakistan’s market shares of the waiver goods in total
EU imports. Similarly, in each of the other subplots, we plot a competing country’s market
shares against Pakistan’s market shares of waiver goods. Each bubble indicates one waiver
good. If all bubbles are close to the vertical or horizontal axis, a competing country overlaps
only slightly with Pakistan over the set of waiver goods exported to the EU. On the other
hand, more bubbles in the interior of a subplot suggest a greater extent of competition
with Pakistan in the EU market. Compared to other major textile- and leather- exporting
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countries with similar export volumes, such as Cambodia and Sri Lanka, Thailand has a
relatively high number of waiver goods for which both Thailand and Pakistan have relatively
large market shares. China, Turkey, and India also have a relatively large number of waiver
goods located in the interiors of such scatter plots. However, these three countries have the
largest market shares of waiver goods in the EU market (see Figure A.2). A majority of
their waiver products have a market share greater than Pakistan’s. These three countries
may, therefore, be well positioned to guard their market shares against competition from
Pakistan.
Vietnam’s overlap with Pakistan over the product space is similar to other competing
countries, such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, whose total values of waiver goods exported
to the EU are close to that of Pakistan. From 2010 to 2013, the average annual growth rate
of Vietnam’s exports of waiver goods to non-EU OECD countries was very high—close to
20%—compared to a more steady and modest rate of 4% for exports to the EU. Vietnam’s
exports of waiver goods to the EU still grew by 5.6% in 2013. Therefore, it is likely that
the estimated trade diversion effect instead reflects the lower growth of Vietnam’s exports
of waiver goods to the EU market related to Vietnam’s export elsewhere.
Admittedly, we lack statistical power to rule out plausible trade diversion effects of waiver
goods on major textile exporters. However, since the set of waiver goods only accounts for
2% of Thailand’s and 8% of Vietnam’s total exports to the EU, respectively, the overall trade
diversion impact is unlikely to be considerable for either country. Unlike Pakistan, for which
waiver goods accounted for more than 30% of its total export to EU, other countries’ exports
are substantially less concentrated in waiver goods. Among competing textile exporters,
Cambodia’s exports mostly concentrate in waiver goods, which still accounted for only 16%
of its exports to the EU in 2012.
The t-statistics on the coefficients are very low for all countries except India on the
extensive margin. For India, the probability of starting new exports decreased by 2.8%
due to the EU’s trade concessions policy to Pakistan. Given that India was one of the
strongest opposers of the EU policy, it is worthwhile looking at India’s exports more closely
although trade diversion effects on the extensive margin were barely significant. Interestingly,
India’s estimated probability of new exports for the waiver products decreased not just in
the EU, but also in other non-EU importers. The estimated probability of new exports of the
waiver products in non-EU countries decreased by 2.3%. Figure A.3 shows the proportion of
India’s export destinations with positive trade flows for the waiver and non-waiver products
respectively. For the non-EU destinations, for both waiver and non-waiver products, time
trends for the proportion of new destinations show very similar patterns. The proportion of
non-EU destinations had been gradually increasing until 2012 and dropped slightly in 2013.
12
On the other hand, for the EU destination, time trends for the proportion of new destinations
were somewhat different between waiver and non-waiver products and especially in 2013. For
non-waiver products, the proportion of new destinations had increased from 2009 to 2013.
However, for waived products, there were huge drops in 2009 and 2013 while there were
virtually no changes in trend from 2010 to 2012. Thus, we could not rule out that the
withdrawal from the export markets in the EU in 2013 was due to trade diversion. From
2012 to 2013, India’s waiver good withdrew from a total of 110 EU destinations and entered
92 EU destinations. Thus, net withdrawal from destinations was 18 for waiver products
from 2012 to 2013. The total value of exports to the 92 new markets was $2.060 billion,
while prior to the withdrawals, the total value of exports to 110 withdrawn destinations was
$2.133 billion. India’s total waived products exported to the EU in 2012 was $2,885 billion.
Thus, the decrease in export volume from net withdrawal is 0.07%, which is quite small
economically. All in all, we find no significant trade diversion effects on competing exporters
from the EU’s tariff concession policy for Pakistan.
4 Timing of Export Boost
4.1 Too Little, Too Late?
The results in Section 2 show that, despite their being temporary, EU’s trade concessions
boosted Pakistan’s exports substantially on both the intensive and the extensive margins.
However, opponents to using trade policies as the main means of aid, argue that trade
concession as aid would be “too little, too late.” Indeed, the EU tariff waivers were not
effective until two and a half years after the floods. Most of the delays were due to political
negotiations addressing the concerns of different EU and non-EU countries, who might have
lost from the EU’s trade concession to Pakistan.
There are several reasons why trade policy still merits consideration as an aid means for
the future. First, as floods hit Pakistan, the international community, including the EU,
provided emergent disaster relief. While trade concessions as a stand alone form of disaster
relief may be too late, they could constitute an effective form of aid, well-complementing with
conventional foreign aid of cash and in-kind transfers. Moreover, Baker and Bloom (2013)
find that indirect effects from increased uncertainty after natural disasters hinder growth as
much as the direct first moment effects of natural disasters. A promise or prospect of trade
concession in the near future could be helpful in mitigating post-disaster uncertainty.
Second, while most forms of disaster relief could be subject to the same criticisms given
to ODA, some of these criticisms may not be applicable to trade concessions as aid. For
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instance, under weak institutions, disaster relief aid may not be delivered to those in need.
Possibly due to such concerns, the EU delivered its disaster relief aid mostly through non-
profit organizations immediately following the floods. Moreover, while voter attention plays
a significant role in the allocation of disaster relief (Eisensee and Stro¨mberg, 2007), policies
to foster economic recovery are likely to require a longer term perspective. In the context
of Pakistan, insurgencies and political instability in the flood-hit areas afterward, remain as
factors impeding growth. Since most forms of disaster relief are used in short term, trade
concessions may provide a longer term aid to disaster-hit countries.
Last but not least, the EU was the first major economy to propose using trade concession
to aid the recovery of a disaster impacted country. Although the EU and the US as well as
other major developed countries have long enforced their own preferential policies through
Generalized Systems of Preferences to lower trade barriers for developing countries, and
some positive effects on trade creation have been reported (Rose, 2004; Frazer and van
Biesebroeck, 2010), it was unclear how effective extra short term measures might be for
developing economies suffering negative shocks. The results of the previous section suggest
that the trade concession were certainly not too little for the flood-hit Pakistan, at least not
in term of trade creation for the target recipient.
4.2 Synthetic Control Analysis
For proponents of trade concessions becoming a standard part of disaster relief, a question
remains that, if the political process for granting trade concessions could be expedited, how
long would it take for tariff waivers to start boosting exports? To answer this question, we
use monthly data of EU imports from Pakistan between 2007 and 2013. To estimate a causal
impact of the tariff waivers, we compare the aggregate monthly Pakistan-to-EU exports of
the waiver products to a synthetic control (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al.,
2010). The synthetic control is a weighted sum of Pakistan-to-EU export volume of 21 HS





where Yˆt is the synthetic control for aggregate Pakistan-to-EU exports for waiver products in
period (month) t; Yjt is the period t’s total Pakistan-to-EU exports of HS Section j products,
excluding the waiver products; wj is the weight assigned to Section j; and C is a set of all
HS sections, constituting the “donor pool” for the construction of synthetic control. The
weights could be chosen by minimizing the mean squared errors of predicting the export of
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waiver products with the synthetic control in the pre-waiver period from January 2007 to
October 2012:













wj = 1 and wj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ C
where Y ∗t is the Pakistan-to-EU exports of products whose tariffs were to be waived from
November 15, 2012; T0 is the last period before the tariff waivers became effective, i.e.
October 2012; t = 1 is the first sample period, i.e. January 2007; and as before Yjt is
the period t total Pakistan-to-EU exports of HS section j products, excluding the waiver
products.
Let Y ∗ = (Y ∗1 , · · · , Y ∗T0)′ be a T0 vector of stacked outcome variables Y ∗t for the treatment
products. Let Yˆt =
∑
j∈C wjYjt so that Yˆ = (Yˆ1, · · · , YˆT0)′ is a T0 vector of stacked outcome
variables Yˆt of the synthetic control. Equation (5) above could be rewritten as:
{wj}j∈C = arg min{wj}j∈C
{






wj = 1 and wj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ C
where V is a T0 × T0 identity matrix. The identity matrix V essentially weights every
pre-intervention period equally. Instead of using an identity matrix for V , Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) propose a data-driven procedure to optimally
select V , which gives a synthetic control that minimizes the expected mean square error of
the synthetic control estimator.
Since proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), the synthetic control analysis has
proven to be a powerful tool in comparative case studies (Abadie et al., 2015). Our use of
the synthetic control method to analyze the monthly Pakistan exports to the EU is motivated
by two considerations. Firstly, the synthetic control analysis provides a visual examination of
how large the waivers’ impacts are on the aggregate export volume of all waived products and
of how quickly such impacts show up in the data. Estimates from an unweighted regression
capture the average treatment effect of tariff waivers across the 75 waived products. But
because different products are traded at different volumes, such average treatment effect
may deviate from the waiver’s impact on aggregate export volume of the waived products,
in particular when the impacts on different products vary with the average trading volume.
While one could weight the products by their per-waiver or average trading volume, the
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synthetic control provides a more transparent way of visualizing the impact of waivers on
the aggregate export of the waived products.
Secondly, the synthetic control method does not rely on the assumption that product-
specific trends among waived products and non-waived products should be common to EU
and non-EU countries, which is assumed in a triple-difference approach. Since we only have
monthly data for trades with the EU and the tariff waivers applied to a group of products
that Pakistan exports in large value to the EU, one might be concerned that the waived
products to the EU might not have shared a common trend with those to non-EU countries
or that the time effect within the group of waived products might have been different from the
time effects within the group of non-waived products (Athey and Imbens, 2006). Moreover,
the synthetic control analysis serves as a robustness check on our triple-difference analysis.
In Figure 3, we plot the monthly exports of Pakistani products with tariffs to be waived
starting November 15, 2012. In the same subplot spanning from January 2007 to December
2013, we also plot the export volume of our synthetic control as described above. As shown
in Figure 3, the time series of the synthetic control matched with the total export value
of waiver products fairly well before November 2012. Moreover, after the tariff waivers
became effective, exports of products with tariff waivers co-moved in similar directions as
non-waived products. Strikingly, in less than two months after the waivers became effective,
exports of tariff-waived products increased dramatically and persisted at a much higher level
throughout the remainder of 2013. In Figure 3, we also plotted the difference between exports
of waived products and the synthetic control. The export hike plotted in Figure 3 is similar
in magnitude to what we find in Table 1, suggesting that our previous results reported in
Table 1 were not due to outlying products with small trading volumes but large responses.
The synthetic control results also addressed the concerns that our waived products exported
to the EU followed a trend different from that of the waiver products exported to non-EU
OECD countries or that of the non-waived products exported to the EU, which constitutes
a maintained identification assumption underlying our triple-difference approach. Table A.1
shows the weights assigned to the EU-bound export volume of each HS sections excluding
the waived products. These weights were obtained by minimizing the weighted mean squared
errors specified in Equation (6) using monthly data from January 2007 to October 2012. We
would have obtained similar results if we had constructed our weights using time series of
trade volumes before July 2010, when the flood took place.
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4.3 Spillover across Products
The donors for our construction of synthetic control are monthly to-EU exports aggregated
to the level of HS sections, excluding goods with tariffs to be waived. We use HS section
aggregates instead of more disaggregate products as donors because waiver goods account for
a large share of total Pakistan exports to the EU and a synthetic control is by construction
a convex combination of donors’ outcomes. Because the aggregate export of waiver goods is
larger than the export value of the largest HS4 product excluding the waiver goods, using
individual products would not be able to produce a synthetic control similar to the aggregate
export of waiver goods in magnitude.
Table A.1 reports the weights assigned to each of 21 HS sections for the synthetic control
shown in Figure 3. Perhaps not surprisingly, Section 11, Textile and Textile Articles, has
the largest weights among all donors. The tariff waivers make exporting waiver goods less
costly than similar textile articles. If the costs of switching products are sufficiently low,
one may be concerned that the export of textile products similar to the waiver goods may
drop. Then, the inclusion of these products in the donors would overstate the trade creation
effects of the tariff-waivers.
To examine this possibility, we perform a placebo test using the triple-difference frame-
work in the previous section. We define the HS6 placebo products as those with the same
HS4 classifications as the waiver goods – but themselves do not have waivers. We drop the
waiver goods and treat the placebo products as if they have waivers in regressions with a
triple-difference specification as in Table 1.
Table 6 reports the results of the placebo tests. If product switching does happen, we
would expect a negative and significant coefficient for the triple interaction term. However,
the coefficient estimates are insignificant, often positive and small.
Moreover, for the nine waiver products with the higher export volumes in our sample
period, we carry out a synthetic control analysis for each of them individually. These nine
products collectively account for about half of the waiver products exported to the EU by
Pakistan in our sample period. To construct the synthetic control for each waiver product
at HS6 level, we exclude all the products in the same chapter (HS2) from the donor pool.8
The monthly export volume of the nine products and their synthetic controls are plotted in
Figure 4. For most products, there were visible increases of exports related to their synthetic
controls once the tariff waivers became effective.
In principle, we could similarly construct a synthetic control for the aggregate export
volume of waiver goods using export volumes of HS sections excluding chapters with any
8There are 96 HS chapters and 11 of them contain at least one waiver good.
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waiver goods. We could also conduct a placebo test by performing a synthetic control analysis
on the aggregate export volume of goods without tariff waivers but similar to waiver goods.
We carry out such exercises and plot the results in Figure A.4, whose format is similar to
that of Figure 3. While we still find an export increase in waiver goods and no apparent
decrease in non-waiver but otherwise textile goods, the synthetic controls poorly assemble
the movements of the outcome variables of their associated treatment groups in the pre-
intervention period. After excluding related HS chapters from the donor pool, the remaining
products account for a relatively small share of Pakistan exports and appear to be not quite
the same as the waiver goods. Alternatively, we could also perform synthetic control for
each waiver product and aggregate all the synthetic controls to another synthetic control for
the aggregate export of waiver goods. However, the resultant two-step synthetic control is
a poor fit to the target it tries to predict. The two-step synthetic control is volatile since
it does not account for the positive correlation induced by the repeated use of individual
donors. After aggregation, a number of donor products end up with a weight much higher
than one.
5 Labor Market Impacts
Whether the trade concessions aided the recovery following the 2010 floods depends on
the extent to which the export boom created labor market opportunities for flood-affected
population. In this section, we provide some descriptive analysis of the labor market impacts
of the EU’s trade concessions.
5.1 Data
The data used in this section consists mainly of the Pakistan Social and Living Standards
Measurement Surveys (PSLMs). PSLMs are national household surveys conducted annu-
ally by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. PSLM samples are representative over the four
provinces of Pakistan as well as the Islamabad Capital Territory. PSLM samples exclude
Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, which are autonomous self-governing re-
gions referred as Pakistan-administrated Kashimir by the United Nations (UN). PSLM sam-
ples also exclude the Federally administrated Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan.
The latest wave of PSLMs available is the 2013-2014 wave. Interviews for this wave were
conducted from late 2013 to early 2014. Hereafter, we refer this wave as the 2013 wave and
use similar references for prior waves. For basic information such as demographics and labor
market activities, the same set of questions is asked across waves. In odd numbered years, a
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larger set of questions, including consumption expenditure, is asked. In even numbered years
a larger sample is collected. We obtained PSLMs from 2006 to 2013. Due to administrative
difficulties, however, the 2009 survey was deferred to 2010 and conducted in conjunction with
the 2010 survey. Combining seven survey years in our sample, we have 369,283 households
and 2,478,650 individuals. Our sample mainly consists of survey years 2007 and 2010 to 2013,
because surveys in 2006 and 2008 contain no information about the industry classification
of subjects’ employment.
The four provinces of Pakistan are further divided into districts. There are 106 districts as
of 2010, with minor changes to the number of districts in our sample period. Since Pakistan
has not conducted a census since 1998, we obtain district level population estimates as of mid-
2010, prior to the floods, from the Demodatabase of the U.S. Census Bureau. Districts are
further divided into sub-districts, known as telsil in Pakistan, for administrative purposes. To
construct district level flood severity, we obtain sub-district level population and percentage
of flood-affected areas from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA).
5.2 Earnings and Employment
As mentioned before, the tariff waivers mainly benefit the textile industries. However, as
shown in Figure 5, areas most severely affected by floods in 2010 tend not to be areas where
the textile industries employ the highest share of workers. As of 2010, there were 106 districts
in the Pakistan’s four provinces. Figure 5 plots the employment share of textile industries
in a district against the flood severity of the district in 2010, where each bubble represents
a district and the size of a bubble indicates the population size of the district as of 2010
prior to the floods. To measure the flood severity in a district, we measure the fraction of








where s indexes sub-districts divisions; Sd is the set of sub-districts dividing district d; fs is
the fraction flooded areas in sub-district s in 2010; and ps is the population of sub-district
s.
Only a small number of districts with considerable textile employment were affected by
the floods. Districts with the most concentrated textile employment tended to be unaffected
by the 2010 floods. Such negative correlation and the fact that the floods mostly affected
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rural areas (Kirsch et al., 2012) may explain why the export volume of textile industries did
not have significant drops.
To investigate the labor market impacts of the floods and the 2013 export boom in textile
industries, we use data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Surveys (PSLMs) to




δtFd1(t = τ) +
2013∑
τ=2010
γtGidt1(t = τ) + γ0Gidt +X
′
idtβ + µt + λd + idt (8)
where i indexes households or individuals; d indexes districts; t indexes survey years; Yidt
is an outcome variable such as household earnings and employment; 1(·) is an indicator
variable equal to one if the statement inside the parentheses is true and zero otherwise; Fd is
flood severity as defined above in Equation (7); Gidt is the local employment share of textile
industries in the areas where the household/individual i resides; Xit is a vector of household
or individual characteristics; µt is a year fixed effect; λd is a district-urbanity fixed effect;
and idt is an error term.
The local employment share of textile industries, Gidt, is defined over geographic units
identified as primary sampling units by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. A primary sam-
pling unit is typically a village in rural areas or an enumeration block in urban areas, and
includes about 200 to 250 households. A typical households in Pakistan has about eight
members. In our sample, each primary sample unit has about 95 observations.
We focus on primary sampling units for local exposure to the textile industries for two
main reasons. First, as shown in Figure 5, the employment share of textile industries in
a typical district is fairly low, averaging about 4%. It is unlikely that the district level
employment shares of textile industries could provide precise estimates on the labor market
impacts we are interested in. Indeed, we do not find contemporary textile employment share
at the district level predicts labor market outcomes in 2013. On the other hand, given that
the labor demand in the textile industries might spill over to local labor markets and non-
tradable goods sectors, a local measure of textile exposure might be better at capturing the
impacts of textile employment than individual affiliation with the textile industries (Kovak,
2013). However, since primary sampling units are coded by the statistics bureau and are
not linked longitudinally, one may be concerned about the simultaneity biases and omitted
variables driving both local textile employment shares and the outcome variables. We will
discuss some of the issues but acknowledge that our estimates in this section may not have
strong causal interpretations.
Since the most disaggregate geographic unit we could link longitudinally is district-
urbanity, we include a district-urbanity fixed effect λd instead of a district fixed effect and an
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indicator variable indicating urban-rural division of a district in our baseline specification.
However, using the later specification does not qualitatively change our results.
We first examine the log value of household labor market earnings in the past year as an
outcome variable Yidt. In this regression, the household characteristics we control for include
a set of indicator variables indicating one of the six levels of education attainment of the
head of the household; a quadratic term of age of the household head; an indicator variable
indicating whether the household head is a woman; and indicator variables indicating the
number of working household members and the size of the household. Estimates of δt and
γt, for t = 2010, · · · , 2013, are plotted in Figure 6.
As shown in the subplot on the left of Figure 6, household earnings in more flood-affected
districts have grown more slowly since year 2010. Although year-to-year changes are not
statistically significant, the estimate of δ2013 is significantly lower than that of δ2010 (with
a p-value of 0.028). This means that households in a district not affected by floods at all,
on average have a 2013 income 2.6% higher than households in a district with 11% of its
population affected by floods in 2010. About 25% of the population live in districts with at
least 11% areas affected by the 2010 floods. However, due to the repeated cross-sectional
nature of our data sets, we are not able to distinguish whether existing households in flood-
hit areas suffer chronical underperformance in income growth or if a composition effect drives
our results. In the context of United States, Strobl (2011) finds that hurricane-prone counties
experience low economic growth partially due to out-migration of richer individuals. The
positive selection of out-migration may drive the lower average earnings of households in the
flood affected areas. However, it is unclear whether the out-migrants after the 2010 floods
were positively selected. Hornbeck and Naidu (2014) find that the Great Mississippi Floods
of 1927 in the American South lead to the immediate and persistent out-migration of the
low-waged black population.
On the right hand side of Figure 6, estimates of γt also show a slightly weaker growth
in earnings for households in high textile employment areas from 2010 to 2012. However,
textile-intensive areas experienced a boost in 2013. The difference between γ2013 and γ2012 is
statistically significant at the 5% level, which suggests that households earnings in neighbor-
hoods without any textile employment, on average, grew 3% less in 2013 than households
in neighborhoods with 13% of their employment in the textile industries.9 About 10% of
the population live in neighborhoods where 13% or more of the workers are employed in the
textile industries.
9Although neither γ2012 nor γ2013 is significant at the 5% level, their difference is significantly different from
zero at the 5% level because the estimated covariance between their estimates is large: Vˆar (γˆ2013 − γˆ2012) =
Vˆar (γˆ2013) + Vˆar (γˆ2012) − ˆ2 Cov (γˆ2013, γˆ2012) = 0.018 + 0.021 − 2 × 0.014 = 0.011. The standard error is
associated with a t-statistic of 2.13 and a p-value of 0.034.
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The higher household earnings for households in textile intensive areas in 2013 is mainly
driven by greater employment opportunities than higher wages. We estimate a linear proba-
bility model where the outcome variable equals to one if an individual is a wage/salary earner
and zero otherwise, but in the labor force. The specification is similar to Equation (8) but
at the individual level. We run regressions separately for men and women. We also control
for individual characteristics by including a quadratic term of age and a set of indicator
variables indicating education attainment. Figure 7 plots the key coefficient estimates of
interests.
For men in textile-intensive areas, the employment growth in 2013 is small and significant
at only the 10% level. On the other hand, women in textile-intensive areas were much more
likely to be employed in 2013 than in 2012. The difference is significant at the 1% level and
suggests that, compared to 2012, women in 2013 were 6.7 percentage points more likely to
be employed in an area with 13% textile employment than women in areas with no textile
employment. Given that only 42% of women in the labor force were wage/salary workers, as
compared to 55% for men, the boom in the textile industries created more work opportunities
for women. This is consistent with the fact that while only 3.8% of working men worked in
the textile industries, 7.4% of working women worked in the textile industries.
Since we use contemporary employment shares of textile industries as an explanatory
variable, one concern is that cross-sectional shocks might drive our estimated employment
gains even in the absence of aggregate shocks. To examine whether this is the case, we plot
the raw overall employment shares of textile industries over our sample years in Figure 8.
There was a large increase in the employment share of textile industries in 2013, which
suggests that the higher employment rate in textile-intensive areas is not entirely driven by
cross-sectional shocks. There also appeared to be an increase in the employment share by
the textile industries in 2012. However, since the interviews of the 2012 wave were conducted
in late 2012 and the first half of 2013, the higher employment share may have picked up an
increase in textile employment in early 2013.
Moreover, the expansion of the textile industries seems to offer greater employment op-
portunities for women previously non-employed or underemployed. Women working in the
textile industries on average reported working for 9.8 months in 2013, as compared to 11
months in 2012.
To investigate the distributive effects, we modify the specification described by Equa-
tion (8) by interacting the term γtGidt with indicator variables indicating the education
attainment of the heads of households. We create six indicator variables to indicate the
six levels of education attainment in Pakistan: (i) less than primary school completion; (ii)
primary school completed; (iii) middle school completed; (iv) secondary school completed;
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δtFd1(t = τ) +X
′
idtβ + µt + λd + idt (9)
where e = 1, · · · , 6 indexes the six education attainment levels described above; Deidt is an
indicator variable indicating education attainment of level e; and the remaining terms are
the same as in Equation (8). A set of indicator variables Deidt now is also included in controls
Xidt.
Let ∆θe = θe2013 − θe2012. Then ∆θe captures how the boom in the textile industries
benefits different households with education attainment e. Figure 9 plots the estimates
of ∆θe with their associated 95% confidence interval for different education attainments.
The textile booms benefit households whose heads did not complete primary schools most.
Compared to households without completing primary education in areas with no textile
employment, households with similar education attainment but living in areas with 13%
textile employment had earnings 7.5% higher in 2013. Such difference is significant at the 1%
level. The increased labor demand in the textile industries seems to benefit low education
households more. The estimated ∆θe for primary, middle elementary and secondary are
positive but insignificant. The estimated ∆θe is negative for higher secondary and post
secondary education, the later of which is significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent
with the factor that in 2013, textile industries employed more workers with primary education
or less, as shown in Figure 10, which plots textile workers’ education attainment over the
sample years.
Textile workers also have slightly lower education than non-textile workers. In Figure 11,
we plot the distribution of the education attainment of textile workers and non-textile work-
ers. However, the stimulus to the textile industries may not have benefited the poorest
households. In areas without any textile employment, median household earnings are 17%
lower than those in areas with positive textile employment. Although education attainment
highly correlates with income in Pakistan as in other countries, and flood-affected districts
have a workforce with only slightly lower education (see Figure 11), it is unclear whether the
most poverty stricken populations benefit from the textile boom. Floods mostly affect rural
areas, where the majority of households engage in agricultural production. In the following
subsection, we discuss potential channels through which the textile industries may benefit
23
this segment of the population.
5.3 Migration and Remittance
Although the flood affected areas tend not to have the highest concentration of textile indus-
tries, migration and remittance may help improve the welfare of the flood-affected population.
PSLMs do not track households over time, nor ask questions on the migratory history of
the subjects. Due to these data limitations, we are not able to track households who move
entirely out of the flooded areas or into areas with greater employment opportunities. How-
ever, if households send one or more of their members to work outside of their permanent
residency, we may be able to detect some migration activities by examining the family struc-
ture. In particular, we consider household age dependency ratio as an outcome variable and
estimate the impacts of the 2010 floods and the textile boom using the same specification
described by Equation (8). Following the same definition of age dependent ratio used by the
World Bank at the country level, we define the age dependency ratio at the household level
as the ratio of non-working-age members to working-age members, where working ages are
15–64.
Figure 12 plots the main estimates as before. As compared to 2007 in the same areas,
the household dependency ratios in more extensively flooded areas tend to be higher. The
coefficients of the interaction between the flood severity measure and the indicator variables
for year are not individually or jointly significant. Thus, no evidence suggests that flooded
areas send more of their household members out to work. However, we note that our data
may not be powerful enough to detect whether migration increases or decreases after natural
disasters. Using household panel surveys, Gro¨ger and Zylberberg (2016) find that households
send out more members to work after a severe typhoon in Vietnam.
On the other hand, areas with higher textile employment shares had a significantly lower
dependency ratio in 2013. Related to 2012, the dependency ratio was 0.03 lower in 2013
areas with 13% of their workers employed by the textile industries. For comparison, the
mean, median and standard deviation of the dependency ratio are close to 1. This suggests
that workers with fewer dependents move into areas with textile jobs in 2013.
Not only an important source of regular revenue, remittance is also insurance payments
responding to income shocks in many developing countries such as Pakistan. Using a re-
gression framework similar to the one used earlier, Figure 13 shows that households in more
extensively flooded districts receive more remittances. Each subplot of Figure 13 represents
coefficient estimates from one regression using the same framework as before. The top row of
subplots has dependent variables about the remittance received by households. In the sam-
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ple of households receiving a positive amount of remittance, households in a 13% flooded
districts received about 15% more remittance in 2010 and 2011 than not flooded districts
(see the top left subplot). There seems to be no evidence that more households received a
positive amount of remittance (see first-row middle subplot, where the dependent variable
is an indicator variable indicating received any remittance in the past year). This result is
consistent with Gro¨ger and Zylberberg’s (2016) findings in the context of Vietnam, where
households with settled migrants before a severe typhoon received an increase in remittance.
As a share of household income in 2010, remittance received by households in a 13% flooded
districts increased by about 6% related to the mean remittance share in household income
(see the right subplot on the first row of Figure 13, where the dependent variable is about
remittance received as a share of income).
However, households working in the textile industries do not seem to send out more
remittance in 2010 or in 2013. The bottom row of Figure 13 plots coefficients from regressions
similar to those on the top row, except that the dependent variables are about remittance
sent out by households and the coefficients reported are about local textile employment share
interacting with indicator variables for year. From left to right, the dependent variables are
respectively log remittance sent, indicator of sending any remittance, and remittance sent as
a share of earnings. We do not find that local textile employment share predicts remittance
sending behaviors in 2010 or in 2013.
Therefore, while households in flooded areas received remittance in the aftermath of
floods, there is no evidence that the remittance is predominantly from textile workers; nor
is there any evidence that households in flooded areas responded to greater employment
opportunities in the textile industries, migrate and send back part of their earnings.
In sum, the hike in textile exports in 2013 brings greater labor market opportunities. The
temporary trade concessions granted by the EU appear to stimulate Pakistan’s exports and
improve its labor market conditions. However, we find no evidence that households in the
flooded areas benefit directly from the improved labor market conditions. We caution that,
due to data limitation, our analysis linking flood-affected households and textile employment
remain preliminary. Further work may shed more light on the effectiveness of EU’s trade
concession as a disaster relief. Moreover, there may be other channels through which the
trade concessions benefit households in flooded areas indirectly. For example, the trade
concession improves government finance in the affected areas, which allows for more resources
to be directed to economic recovery.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates trade concessions as a potential policy for aiding a disaster-hit coun-
try. Using a triple-difference method and a synthetic control method, we first examine how
the temporary trade concessions affected Pakistan exports. The triple-difference approach
allows us to fully control for product-destination differences, as well as destination-year and
product-year shocks. Our synthetic control analysis supplements the triple-difference ap-
proach by providing a visualization of the tariff waivers’ timing and aggregate impacts.
We find that the waivers increased Pakistan’s exports of waiver goods greatly and rapidly,
without substantially harming the exports of individual competing countries. The export
boost to the textile industries brought greater labor market opportunities, particularly for
women and people with little education. However, we do not find evidence that the expansion
in textile industries was particularly beneficial to households most affected by the 2010 floods.
Though we note that our labor market analysis is preliminary due to data limitations, our
findings suggest that trade policy may not be a substitute for traditional means of disaster
relief, because it is unlikely to effectively target the populations most affected. Nevertheless,
trade concessions may be a cost-effective policy when they complement more traditional
types of aid, such as cash transfers. The EU’s nominal loss of tariff revenue amounted to
about 107 million euros, which is tiny compared to its spending on foreign aid; Germany
alone spent 10 billion euros on ODA in 2012.
On the other hand, trade concessions to disaster-hit countries may facilitate their recovery
and be conducive to long-term growth, for several reasons. First, trade concessions may
mitigate macroeconomic uncertainty in the aftermath of natural disasters, which have been
shown to impede growth (Baker and Bloom, 2013). Second, developing countries may lack
state capacity to raise tax revenue in response to post-disaster fiscal needs. A favorable
external environment for their formal tradable sector, which is relatively easy to tax, may
assist the government in funding infrastructure rebuilding, providing disaster relief, and
counteracting any political instability induced by the disaster. While dependency on foreign
aid in the form of cash or in-kind transfers may dampen states’ incentives to develop the
legal and fiscal capacity to provide public goods, such as disaster relief (Besley and Persson,
2014), the more market-based approach through trade concessions may arguably be less
likely to distort state incentives to invest in state capacity.
If weak institutions render ODA ineffective, foreign aid policies should be devised that
take into consideration any institutional constraints; in particular, in countries with weak
institutions, trade concessions may facilitate economic recovery and growth. Further studies
may shed light on the conditions under which trade policy might be more or less potent.
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However, given the limitations and drawbacks of traditional ODA as the primary means of
foreign aid, our findings suggest that there is considerable scope for trade policy to comple-
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Notes: Each bubble is a district, whose population as of 2010 is indicated by the size of the bubble. The
y-axis represents the employment share of textile industries. The x-axis represents the flood severity defined
by Equation (7).
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G: Employment Share of Textile, Garment & Leather Industries
Notes: The graphs above plot the coefficient estimates of the specification given by Equation (8). The
dependent variable is the log value of household earnings in the last year. The sample includes 198,961
households in PSLM waves 2007 and 2010–2013. The left subplot above contains the estimates of δt, which
are the interaction terms between the fraction of flood-affected population and the indicator variables for
year; The right subplot above contains the estimates of γt, which are the interaction terms between the
local employment share of textile industries and the indicator variables for year. The bars indicated 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the district-urbanity level. The control variables
include household characteristics, district-urbanity fixed effects, and year fixed effects.
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Notes: The graphs above plot the coefficient estimates of the specification given by Equation (8). The
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual is a paid employee and zero
otherwise. The sample includes 377,212 working-age individuals in the labor force from PSLM waves 2007
and 2010–2013. Both subplots above contain the estimates of γt, which are the interaction terms between
the local employment share of textile industries and indicator variables for year. The left subplot plots
γt from the male sample; the right subplot plots γt from the female sample. The bars indicated 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the district-urbanity level. The control variables
include individual characteristics, district-urbanity fixed effects, and year fixed effects.
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Figure 9: 2013-2012 Differences on How Local Textile Employment Share Affects Household
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Notes: The graphs above plot the coefficient estimates of the specification given by Equation (9). The
dependent variable is the log value of household earnings in the last year. The sample includes 198,961
households in PSLM waves 2007 and 2010–2013. The graph above plots estimates of θt, which are the
triple-interaction terms of the local employment share of textile industries, the indicator variables for year,
and indicator variables of education attainments. The bars indicated 95% confidence intervals. Standard
errors are clustered at the district-urbanity level. The control variables include household characteristics,




























































































































































































































































































G: Employment Share of Textile, Garment & Leather Industries
Notes: The graphs above plot the coefficient estimates of the specification given by Equation (8). The
dependent variable is the age dependent ratio. The sample includes 198,961 households in PSLM waves
2007 and 2010–2013. The left subplot above contains the estimates of δt, which are the interaction terms
between the fraction of flood-affected population and the indicator variables for year; The right subplot
above contains the estimates of γt, which are the interaction terms between the local employment share of
textile industries and the indicator variables for year. The bars indicated 95% confidence intervals. Standard
errors are clustered at the district-urbanity level. The control variables include household characteristics,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Tariff Waivers and Pakistan’s Exports to the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU × Waiver 0.218 0.189
(0.223) (0.188)
Waiver × Post 0.026 0.0001
(0.142) (0.149)
EU × Waiver × Post 0.338* 0.308** 0.323** 0.361** 0.330** 0.372**
(0.176) (0.139) (0.154) (0.151) (0.144) (0.147)
Fixed Effects:
Importer × Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Product × Importer Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y Y Y
Initial Sample Y Y Y
No. of Observations 209,301 209,301 209,301 116,430 116,430 116,430
R2 0.641 0.825 - 0.680 0.820 -
Notes: Each observation is about the export of one product to one importer in one year. The dependent
variable is the log value of exports. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two-way clustering at
importer and product levels. The product, product-year, and product-importer fixed effects, are all at the
HS-6 digit level. When there are three fixed effects, R2 is not comparable to other cases as one of fixed
effects are accounted for by within transformation. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 2: Tariff Waivers and Pakistan’s Exports to the EU: Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU × Waiver 0.012 0.012
(0.056) (0.059)
Waiver × Post -0.003 -0.003
(0.025) (0.027)
EU × Waiver × Post 0.049* 0.049* 0.049* 0.049*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Fixed Effects:
Importer × Year Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y
Product × Importer Y Y
No. of Observations 2,569,716 2,569,716 2,569,716 2,569,716
R2 0.099 0.423 0.630 -
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two-way clustering at the importer and product levels.
The product, product-year, and product-importer fixed effects, are all at the HS-6 digit level. * p < 0.10; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Tariff Waivers and Pakistan’s Exports to Non-EU Countries
Dependent Variable: log(Export) 1(Export > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Waiver 3.110*** 2.630*** 0.596***
(0.380) (0.372) (0.058)
Waiver × Post 0.228 0.026 -0.001 0.0001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.173) (0.164) (0.151) (0.151) (0.026) (0.028)
Fixed Effects:
Importer × Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Product × Importer Y Y Y
Initial sample Y Y
No. of Observations 77,806 77,806 44,853 44,853 877,464 877,464
R2 0.247 0.830 0.250 0.827 0.095 0.402
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two-way clustering at the importer and product levels.
The product, product-year, and product-importer fixed effects, are all at the HS-6 digit level. * p < 0.10; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 4: Tariff Waivers and Pakistan’s Exports to the EU: Heterogeneous Effects by Tariff
Reduction
Dependent Variable: log(Export) 1(Export > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU × waiver× Post 0.219** 0.394** 0.035 0.051**
(0.098) (0.181) (0.020) (0.021)
EU × waiver× (tariff-cut-8)× Post 0.021 -0.035 0.001 -0.017**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.005) (0.007)
Fixed Effects:
Importer × Year Y Y Y Y
Product × Importer Y Y Y Y
Product × Year Y Y
No. of Observations 197,038 1,054,080
Notes: The median of tariff rate of waived products is 8%. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for
two-way clustering by importer and product. The product, product-year, and product-importer fixed effects,
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Market Share of Pakistan
India
Notes: In each subplot, the horizontal axis represents Pakistan’s market share of a waiver good in EU’s
total import of the waiver goods; the vertical axis represents a competing country’s market share of the
same waiver good in EU’s total import of the waiver goods. Each subplot represents a different competing
country as indicated on the subplot titles. Each bubble represents a waiver product and the size of a bubble
indicates EU’s total import value of that good from 2010 to 2012.
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Notes: The pie chart above shows 10 countries’ market shares of waiver goods in EU’s imports in 2012. The
chart legend lists the 10 countries with the largest market shares in descending order.
Figure A.3: Percentage of India’s Export Destinations with Positive Export for Waiver and
Non-waiver Products
Notes: In both subplots, the vertical axis on the left represents the proportion of non-EU destinations to
which India exports; the vertical axis on the right represent the proportion of EU destinations to which India
exports.
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Figure A.4: Synthetic Control Analysis for Aggregate Pakistan-to-EU Export of Waiver
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